




INTRODUCTION: A DEFINITION OF TERMS
The origin of the word "multinational" to describe certain types
of corporations has gained rapid and wide acceptance within the
past few years. These companies have been the subject of a good
deal of critical, and not so critical, writing because of their tremen-
dous growth in size and in numbers and because the breadth and
density of their operations have drastically changed world economic
and social structures.
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The first use of this term, according to Howe Martyn of the
American University,' was made in an address by David Lilienthal
of the Tennessee Valley Authority and later of the Development
and Research Corporation, given in Philadelphia in 1958 and
published in a book of essays in 1960.
Many large and even medium sized American corporations are
already operating in other countries, in one way or another. By
operating I do not mean merely that they have a financial stake,
like a portfolio investment, in business in other countries than their
own; nor do I refer only to sales, agencies, or distributors. I have
particularly in mind industrial or commercial operations abroad
which directly involve corporate managerial responsibility.
Such corporations-which have their home in one country but
which operate and live under the laws and customs of other coun-
tries as well-I would like to define here as multinational corpo-
rations.2
It is essential at the outset to distinguish the multinational cor-
poration from the international corporation. The latter basically
is an international trader, an exporter of goods and services across
state lines who fits within the traditional framework of inter-
national trade theories. The "internationalism" of the inter-
national corporation is basically concerned with barriers to inter-
national trade. A strong opponent of tariffs and quantitative re-
strictions, the natural inclination of the international corporation
would be to support the movement recently manifested by inter-
national labor: to equalize costs of manpower and capital in all
industrial countries.
On the other hand, the multinational corporation distinguishes
itself by the allocation of its resources on an international basis.
Thus, not only its produce, but also its basic factors of production-
capital, management and technology-are all enlisted in the global
search for profits.
For nations, then, to resort to tariff barriers in an age of multi-
national enterprise when transfers of production across national
boundaries have made obsolete former trade theories, is to miss
the point. Likewise, to encourage or even require voluntary re-
straints and other forms of quantitative restrictions, while inward
foreign direct investment is unrestrained and outward foreign
1. H. MATYN, MULTINATIONAL BUSnUZSS MANAGEMENT 1 (1970).
2. MANAGEMWNT AND CORPORATIONS 1985, 119 et seq. (M. Anshen and
G. L, Bach eds. 1960).
investment is inhibited or in some cases prohibited, is to succumb
to the cure without understanding the disease.
This paper will examine what has been perceived as a growing
trend among multinational companies toward the centralization
of their international operations, which is, as this paper suggests,
as it should be. In practice, however, one strongly suspects that
most companies are still groping for an appropriate superstructure
by or through which they may adequately control the far-reaching
empires.
The groping for control and the battle over centralization versus
decentralization of the international operations of the multina-
tionals began in earnest in the early 1960's when the parent cor-
poration suddenly became aware of the enormous investment it
had outside the United States and of the fact that such investment
was growing more rapidly than its U.S. investments. These cap-
tains of industry suddenly realized that their international opera-
tions were too important to be left to expatriates hardly known at
the home offices. It was widely believed, that if international
operations could do so well under the old regime of benign neglect,
they should really prosper when the strings were brought back
home to the bosom of the parent. Unfortunately, these disruptions
were a blow to the morale of the international group and the
centralization of control at the base of the parent's operations was
generally without the sensitivity and understanding necessary to
insure a smooth take-over and a properly functioning establishment
thereafter.
Our thesis is that, ideally, international decision making should
be managed from a central control point, leaving day-to-day man-
agement and operational control within each of the operating loca-
tions. The purpose of the central location would be, basically, to
get an overview of the world, to put together the pieces of the
global enterprise in such a manner as to be able to take advantage
of the shifting trade, financial, monetary and development whims
of not only the free world but, more recently, the communist
world which is wont to enter the international monetary and
development markets in a major way.
This thesis gains support from writers in the area of business
administration and industrial management, 3 from the existing
international legal environment in which multinational enterprise
operates, and from the inherent nature and ability of multinational
enterprise to operate within a nation-state, while either avoiding or
diminishing the impact of such state's laws and decrees.
3. See discussion under "A RSviEw OF = LITERATuRE," infra at 73-80.
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A REVIEW OF Tm LITERATURE
The greatest strength of the multi-national is not in its financial
resources, nor its marketing methods, nor even its innovative tech-
nology. It is found rather in the managerial ability to marshall
all the factors of industry in a dynamic and creative whole.4
The role of corporate management has, within the postwar period,
been highlighted as one of businesses' most important corporate
resources.5 Clearly, effective use of management, especially as
viewed in the ever-expanding scope of multinational enterprise,
can be ensured only by aligning top management with a suitable
organizational structure and action format. No single management
regime can be equally effective for all phases of multinational
enterprise (i.e., industrial, technological, service, etc.), as enterprise
must yield in part to the pervasive laws and policies of the
countries its operations transcend.
Nevertheless, the multitude of proposals to date are problematic
not because each one offers the rudiments of a single scheme to
be utilized by all corporations involved in global operations, but
rather, because they treat the management anomalies of the
multinational corporation (MNC) as they would a domestic or
international corporation. The difficulties involved in managing
the multinational are unique:
Managing a multinational firm is not just like managing a do-
mestic firm on a bigger scale. It is a different job. It is different
because of the special problems and needs, which are salient
when a firm becomes multinational.6
Moreover, because the effects of external factors (e.g., fluctuations
of currency exchange rates, the laws and tax regulations of the
various countries within which a global enterprise operates, shifts
in the conditions creating foreign markets, etc.), are more severely
felt in the MNC than in other corporations, a fundamentally dif-
ferent management structure is properly in order. This article is
purposed upon outlining such a structure, one which will more
4. Sarnoff, Multinationalism: A New Challenge to Management, THE
MBA 40 (1969).
5. Business International S.A., Managing the Multinationals: Preparing
for Tomorrow, 144 (1972) in conjunction with the Centre d' Etudes Indus-
trielles, Geneva.
6. R. HAYS, INTERNATIONAL BusnTnss: INTRODUCTIO1 TO THE WORLD OF
THE MULTINATIONAL Fnuv 267 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HAYs].
perfectly integrate and more efficiently utilize all of the factors
surrounding today's global enterprise.
An examination of those proposals already published7 is best ac-
complished by general summary, the emphasis being placed on
those elements which acknowledge the notion of centralization
and/or decentralization of management for the multinational
enterprise.
Initially, it should be noted that throughout all phases of manage-
ment of the multinational there exists an increasingly severe
shortage of managers qualified by "international" experience. The
vast majority of firms are American-based, and consequently em-
ploy primarily Americans in upper management. Though some
countries require that firms operating within their borders employ
a percentage of indigenous managers, these individuals generally
are not promoted to top management levels. There is consensus
that any effective regime should at least include processes whereby
new managerial talent can be bred; talent which should include
numerous foreign nationals.
Within those proposals expounding decentralization of manage-
ment, certain considerations seem prevalent. First, the ability
of a multinational enterprise to move far toward centralization
is severely constrained in that the informational input from foreign
subdivisions is so varied it cannot be validly processed by top
level management (ie., the international division). Moreover,
marketing policies must be carefully designed around the specific
needs of the foreign division, thereby defying utilization of a single,
centralized format. The same holds true for economic conditions.
Second, the diversity of external factors requires the suborgani-
zational structure of the MNC to solve problems which are peculiar
to certain geographic regions, a requirement it would not be able
to meet were its hands to be tied by a "centralized" policy. As
heretofore mentioned, laws and public policies differ in each region
(e.g., tax laws, import/export restrictions, etc.). Managerial struc-
ture must yield to such divergencies. Too often, the implications
of local politics are given insufficient consideration in a system
which stresses centralization.
7. See generally E.J. KOLDE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 218-
33 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as KOLDE]; J. STOPFORD & L. WELLS,
JR., VIANAGING THE MULTI-NATIONAL ENTERPRIsE/ORGANizATIoN OF THE FIRv
AND OWNERSHIP OF THE SUBSIDIARIES (1972); J.S. SCHWENDnvrAN, STRATEGIC
AND LONG-RANGE PLANNING FOR THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION (1973);
HAYs, supra note 6, at 260 et seq.; Mennis and Sauvant, The Multinational
Corporations, Managers, and the Development of Regional Identifications in
Western Europe, 403 ANNALS 22-23 (1972).
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Third, only with decentralization can the decision-making power
of the enterprise be delegated to indigenous management. Clearly,
this can be useful to supply powerful motivation to local managers,
who might otherwise resent the subservience a centralized system
would necessarily impose upon them. This is not to suggest, how-
ever, that local management may ignore the overall objectives
of the MNC, but rather allows indigenous management to adjust
individually to the subordinate national goals.
Similarly, with theories for centralization of top management of
multinational enterprise, certain considerations are outstanding
in the literature to date. Of greatest importance to the multina-
tional is its need to function effectively as an organic whole. Such
coordination presumes a central purpose. Only through centralized
management can a worldwide perspective on the interests of the
total enterprise be maintained and the goals of the corporate whole
be achieved. Moreover, because international managerial talent
is scarce, such available talent is best utilized centrally, since it
would not otherwise be possible to duplicate the talent in each
foreign affiliate.
Existing literature also goes on to point out the peculiar advan-
tages centralization has over a system of decentralized subdivisions.8
With respect to foreign production, centralized management can
provide alternative choices to indigenous costs of fabrication, labor-
rates, the price of raw materials and trade regulation policies.
Furthermore, centralization provides the multinational corporation
with better overview and control through which to adjust its
operations to differing interest rates, fluctuations in currency
stability, and the availability of foreign exchange, financing and
funding.
Clearly, the extent to which there can be centralization of man-
agement is directly proportional to the degree to which subdivisions
of the MNC can be integrated. As a practical matter, centralization
seems the only alternative when a multinational enterprise has
diversified operations. Otherwise, there would be no effective
means of interrelating and integrating the MNC's global operations
so as to provide the synergism which is its purported purpose and
advantage over the purely domestic or simply international firms.9
8. KoLDE, supra note 7, at 227.
9. This is not to overlook the "behavioral" requirement that multina-
MultinationaZs and Nation States
The essence of the multinational corporation is its willingness
to allocate all of its resources on an international basis. Its purpose
in so doing is to maximize the global profits of the enterprise.
This presupposes that there is somewhere a central organ to which
all impulses and signals flow and from which all commands eman-
ate. Otherwise, it is the nature of the individual operations, which
are normally established as separate profit centers, to function
and think for themselves, and to do that which is good only for
themselves.
The power of the private corporate enterprise to transfer pro-
duction from one country to another, to increase capital spending
within any given country or to transfer capital from any given
country to another has been its major source of strength and growth,
as well as the basis for the widespread doubts about the capacity
of any given national economy to experience self-generated growth.
The national division of any global enterprise must naturally
respond to the internal political pressures of the nation state within
which it operates. The multinational enterprise, on the other hand,
cannot afford to do so.
A Chicago program on Anti-Inflation Law: "Wages-Prices-
Foreign Trade-Taxation," sponsored by the American Law Insti-
tute and the American Bar Association in October, 1971, provided
a forum for speculation on some of the tools in the multinational
corporate arsenal by which the impact of the new economic policies
of the government of the United States could be avoided.'0 In so
doing, the following example was used:
Chrysler imports diesel engines from the UK to power certain of
its U.S. built commercial vehicles. Similarly, Ford imports four
cylinder engines from its UK subsidiary for incorporation into its
U.S. built Pinto car. Both of these companies could, at least
temporarily, substitute U.S. built engines in such vehicles and thus
avoid the ten percent (10%) surcharge. If the surcharge were to
tional planning must necessarily be interactive with secondary management
so as to: (1) prevent the feeling in lower level managers that they do not
participate in the decision making process and (2) ensure that vital infor-
mational inputs from tertiary management is communicated freely and cur-
rently. Though some suggest that with increased centralization, the re-
sponsibilities of the various functional levels become difficult to define
preferable, the central staff should act as coordinators and advisors of the
substructure, while indigenous management remains responsible for the
implementation of the centrally designed operational plans.
10. See the "Background Memorandum" of Seymour J. Rubin and the
"Supplemental Background Memorandum" of Albert S. Golbert on Multi-
national Enterprise and the New Economic Program, ALI-ABA CousE OF
STUDY, ANTi-INFLATioN LAW, WAGES-PRICEs-FoREIGN TRADE-TAXATION 97,
107 (1971).
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be with us for an extended period of time, it would be quite possi-
ble for both Ford and Chrysler to shift production of their re-
spective vehicles from the United States to Canada wherein such
engines could be imported free of surcharge. As the value of the
UK engines to the whole vehicle is probably such that their use
would not deprive the vehicle of its classification as a "Canadian"
vehicle, it could then be imported and sold in the United States
pursuant to the Canadian-U.S. Automotive Agreement free of such
surcharge which is not applied to items which were previously im-
ported free of duty.
While the first shift, from UK engines to U.S. engines, would be
helpful to U.S. balance of trade and payments, and result in a
"return" of jobs to the United States, the second shift, if the sur-
charge were continued on a long-term basis, to production in
Canada, would prove the measures to be self-defeating and leave
the economy worse off than before.
But multi-national firms are not simply profit maximizers. They
have multiple concerns and live with multiple constraints, reflect-
ing diverse interests within the corporate group and differing pres-
sures from governments in various countries. Many of their de-
cisions grapple with an uncertain and distant future, and it does
excessive violence to their problems to imagine that there is a
single best solution. Thus, should a variety of intra-company con-
siderations lead Ford and Chrysler not to shift their production at
all, but to absorb the ten percent (10%) surcharge in the U.S., or,
by adjusting the intra-company pricing, to transfer all or part of
its effects to the UK, there could be little or no balance of payments
effect in the United States. Moreover, if the dollar has been de-
valued vis-A-vis the pound, a change in the terms of trade will
have taken place and, as far as the consolidated books of the com-
pany are concerned, the sale of the engines even at a reduced price
could, nevertheless, produce as much in dollars as it previously
did."1
Were the decision left to the UK or the Canadian company, or
even to the U.S. operating company, it would, no doubt, be based
upon what is best for that company, without consideration of the
global enterprise. This, of course, is entirely understandable be-
cause no national branch or subsidiary of the corporate group is
or can be aware of the global requirements of the enterprise.
Professor Jack N. Behrman, in writing for an earlier symposium
on multinational enterprise, was of the opinion that "the means of
operation and control" is one of "the characteristics which dis-
tinguish a multinational enterprise from other foreign invest-
ments.' -2
11. Id.
12. Behrman, The Multinational Enterprise: Its Initiatives and Govern-
mental Reactions, 15 J. INwVL L. AND EcoN. 215 (1972).
In distinguishing the activities of multinational enterprise from
earlier foreign investment organizations under the "colonial" form
and the "international holding company" form, Professor Behrman
noted that:
The objective of the multinational enterprise is to meld its for-
eign affiliates into an operational entity, integrated with the ac-
tivities of the parent, to serve the world market. It is the projec-
tion onto the world market of the concept and operation of the
U.S. giant corporation as it operates in the continental common
market of the United States....
It has three characteristics which are significant from the stand-
point of public policy: central control by the parent, a common
strategy for the entire enterprise, and integration of operations
of affiliates with each other and the parent. It is not enough for
the parent to have control. . . Control under the multinational
enterprise is being exercised and applied in a common strategy...
The common strategy does include the integration of all affiliates
with each other and the parent. Not all operations are as yet
fully integrated, but multinational enterprises are moving in this
direction as fast as it is economically feasible.
13
Professor Behrman recognizes that "these characteristics are not
fully accepted in the literature as yet"' 4 and certainly not in
practice either. Nevertheless, the reasons for turning toward cen-
tralization are becoming more and varied, and both present impetus
and future developments should prove to be compelling in this
regard.15
In 1918, Walter Rathenau wrote that "the depersonalization of
ownership, the objectification of enterprise, the detachment of
property from the possessor, leads to a point where the other prize
becomes transferred into an institution which resembles the state
in character."' 6
rn 1928, the Social Science Research Institute of America, fol-
lowing Rathenau's lead, reached the conclusion that the typical
American corporation had ceased to be a part of business enterprise
and had become an institution. As a result, Adolph Berle, Jr. and
Gardner C. Means were commissioned to study the phenomenon
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Further support of the tendency of MNC's "to centralize control of
basic strategies in order to operate in the most efficient manner and to
exploit opportunity on a worldwide basis . . . ." comes from Hadari, The
Structure of the Private Multi-National Enterprise, 71 MIcH. L. REv. 729,
746-54 (1973). Although Mr. Hadari appears to be less than certain as to
the trends indicating that "signs of decentralization have again appeared
as a sign of foreign interests and firms has continued to grow thereby mak-
ing centralization less manageable and efficient- . . ." including that "the
forms and trends of control ... must be ascertained on a case by case
basis," Id. at 751.
16. W. RATHENAT, IN DAYS To Colm 120-21 (1921).
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of the American corporation, particularly in the context of owner-
ship.
The final paragraph of their classic study contained a conclusion
which must then have been startling:
The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration
of economic power which can compete on equal terms with the
states .... The future may see the economic organism, now typi-
fied by the corporation, not only on an equal plane with the state,
but possibly even superseding it as the dominant form of social
organization.' 7
Thirty-five years later, John Kenneth Galbraith even postulated
that the line between the corporation and the state would disap-
pear.
8
The international implications of the respective theses of Rath-
enau, Berle and Means were never developed by the authors, nor
did Galbraith do more than indicate that the line between the
corporation and the state was disappearing. Failure to deal with
the international characteristics of the problem may be more than
an oversight, it may be the result of an inability to deal radically
with the nationality and political ties of multinational corporations
which, for many purposes, are at once stateless and a quasi-state.
Except for the fact that a corporation lacks defined territory over
which it exercises exclusive sovereignty and an administration
which is recognized by other sovereigns as a "government," it has
most everything else a nation-state should have, and many things
which some recognized states lack. In short, it is a highly developed
form of human association, the most significant aspect of which,
especially, is sheer size and importance of purpose.
Thus, while the relationship between the multinational corpora-
tion and existing nations-states may be described in many respects
as being symbiotic, it is also highly competitive in that the interests
of the multinational corporation may not always coincide with
those of the nations-states with which it has dealings, or for that
matter, with those of the society of nations in which it functions
freely.
It is highly unlikely, however, that the future holds an interna-
17. BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
313 (1967).
18, J, GALRRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 399-400 (1967).
tional status equivalent to that of nations-states in store for the
multinational corporation, nor is it likely that corporations will be
granted international status sooner than private individuals.
Clearly the private corporation cannot and should not be granted
the international status equal to that of public international organi-
zations. Unless all corporate persons or indeed all legal individuals
were admitted to such status, the borderline between those who
have and those who have not international legal status would be
difficult if not impossible to draw. More importantly, the elimi-
nation of differences in status between states and public interna-
tional organizations, representing public interests and constitution-
ally responsible to the public, and private corporations, represent-
ing private interests and pursuing private objectives, would be
subversive of the basic objectives of international order. It would
be no more tenable than the elimination, in municipal law, of the
distinction between governmental and other public authorities on
the one part and the private legal subject on the other part.19
It should be apparent from what has been said that not everyone
is happy with the growth of multinational corporations. The report
issued by the United Nations on MNC's estimates that in 1971 the
multinationals controlled 1/5 of the world's gross national product
not including the centrally planned economies. A recent report
issued by the Diebold Institute entitled Business and Developing
Countries2" estimates the production of the multinationals is in-
creasing by 10 percent a year, double the growth rate of the world's
GNP. One author recently postulated an examplum horribilis
wherein the multinationals, having bought out the entire world,
could all merge into a gigantic conglomerate, World Inc. whose
chairman pulls down a 100 million dollars a year salary plus the
customary "fringes" including Social Security benefits at age 65.
World Inc. will control everything from the corner newsstand to
the new world government, a subsidiary of World Inc., and colonies
on the planets.
21
THE BARCELONA TRACTION CASE: AN IMPETUS
To CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT
From the prospective of the multinational, the lack of a definite
international juridical status is a great drawback. Recent inter-
national jurisprudence, in respect of the protection of the inter-
national corporate investments of the multinationals, has provided
good reason for their insecurity in this regard and another good
reason for centralization of their operations.
19. W. FRmF AN, THE CHANGiNG STRucTu= o InNATiONAL LAw 233
(1964).
20. Diebold Institute, Business and Developing Countries (1973).
21. Fuller, Local Firms Seen Aiding LDC's, J. INT'L COM. (Apr. 22, 1973).
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Th particular, the holding of the International Court of Justice
in the Barcelona Traction Case,22 (Belgium v. Spain) should now
have been read and absorbed by the corporate counsel of most
multinationals and should have major impact upon their choice of
corporate entity for the control of their operating subsidiaries and
branches around the world. This case, standing alone, should be
more than sufficient to ensure that such decisions are no longer to
be made exclusively upon the basis of political, economic, or tax
considerations.
Barcelona Traction: The Issues
Although Belgium sought the aid of the International Court of
Justice in 1958, the proceedings were halted for a time while the
parties tried to negotiate a settlement. No solution having been
reached, Belgium again filed an application with the International
Court alleging damage to Belgian nationals, shareholders in Barce-
lona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., a Canadian corporation,
resulting from conduct towards the company by Spain which
violated international law. The Spanish government raised four
preliminary objections to the Belgian claim. In 1964, the Interna-
tional Court rejected the first two Spanish contentions, that the
previous discontinuance precluded the claim, and that Spain could
not be required to submit to the jurisdiction of the court. The third
and fourth preliminary objections, alleging that the Belgian gov-
ernment lacked standing to maintain the action and had not ex-
hausted local remedies, were joined to the merits of the case. The
gravaman of the case was that Spanish exchange control restric-
tions prevented certain Spanish subsidiaries of Barcelona Traction
from transferring funds to their Canadian parent, which funds
were required by the parent to service certain debt obligations.
The obligations were owed, in part, to Spanish creditors, who suc-
cessfully caused bankruptcy proceedings to be entered against the
Spanish subsidiaries of Barcelona Traction. The subsidiaries were
ordered seized, and constructive civil possession of their shares was
taken. Barcelona Traction's efforts to contest the jurisdiction of
the Spanish courts failed and in 1969 the Barcelona Court of Appeals
approved the election by creditors of trustees in bankruptcy. The
22. Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co., Ltd., Case [1970] I.C.J. 3
[hereinafter cited as Barcelona].
trustees procured a decision which cancelled the existing shares
outside of Spain, made Barcelona the head office of the subsidiaries,
and offered the public sale of new shares in such company. The
former bondholders of Barcelona Traction, through a new Spanish
corporation, gained control of the former Spanish subsidiaries and
further proceedings by Barcelona Traction proved to be of no
avail.
Although the Canadian government initially complained to Spain
about the denial of justice to Barcelona Traction, and in particular
suggested that such actions violated a treaty between Spain and
Canada, Spain did not consent to a Canadian proposal for arbitra-
tion, and subsequently, the Canadian interest ceased.
In its decision on the merits of the case, the International Court
ruled against Belgium on the ground that the Belgian government
lacked standing to maintain the action because Barcelona Traction
was a juristic national of Canada, and the mere fact that the
majority of the shareholders were Belgian nationals did not give
Belgium the right to espouse the claim.23 The ruling was based
on the proposition that only the nation of which the corporation
is a national may protect the company.24 The Court felt that the
shareholders had mere interests in their corporation, and the
indirect injury inflicted upon them was insufficient to allow
Belgium to espouse their claim.
25
Although the Court correctly noted the absence of precedent-for
allowing shareholders to maintain an action in this type of situation,
the decision is open to attack. Initially, should Canada have been
considered the national state of Barcelona Traction when the
latter's ties to Canada were limited? Secondly, is the distinction
between shareholder rights and mere interests with respect to
their company as clear as the Court would have us believe?
Finally, is the decision consistent with other situations where the
national states of shareholders have been permitted to espouse a
claim for injury to the corporation, and the developing notion of
multiple protection in international law?
Indeed, some of the judges who decided the case wrote separate
opinions disagreeing with the majority opinion with respect to
the above questions. Five judges wrote opinions in support of
Belgium's right to bring the action on behalf of the shareholders.
Four of these were concurring opinions with a lone dissent from
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Judge Fitzmaurice felt compelled to vote with the majority of the
Court strictly on the grounds of stare decisis. He noted that the
established rule allowed only the national state of the corporation
to bring an action for injury done to the company. But while he
concurred with the majority on the basis of this technical rule as
he referred to it, he went on to point out some of the shortcomings
of the principle. He suggested that international law should be
more liberal in recognizing harm to shareholders when their
company has been injured. He also expressed displeasure over
the failure of the parties to present argument concerning the
nationality of the company itself, and the effect of the Nottebohm
26
(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) decision on this case.
Judge Tanaka came to similar conclusions with respect to the
right of Belgium to sue on behalf of its nationals, since the share-
holders had suffered an injury. But he voted with the majority
because he felt Spain would win on the merits of the case anyway.
Judge Jessup also agreed with the principle of permitting the
national state of the shareholders to sue on their behalf. However,
he felt the plaintiff should fail in this case since continuous owner-
ship of a substantial number of the shares by Belgian nationals
had not been established. Finally, Judge Gros recognized the right
of the shareholders to be protected, but he joined the majority here
because he thought the connection between Barcelona Traction
and the Belgian economy had not been sufficiently proved. In
addition, he found that Belgium had failed to exhaust its local
remedies in this case. Hence, the question of Belgium's capacity
to bring the action upon which the decision turned was not as
clear as the 15-1 vote would indicate.
Potential Bases for State Maintained Actions
There are two possible legal bases for permitting a state to
maintain an action on behalf of the shareholders of an injured
company. These two legal mechanisms will be discussed in the
context of the Barcelona Traction Case, although they are certainly
capable of more general application.
The first would allow Belgium to bring an action on behalf of
Barcelona Traction Company itself on the ground that the cor-
26. Nottebohm Case [1955] I.C.J.-5.
poration was in fact a Belgian national. While the Belgian govern-
ment did not ultimately claim to be the national state of the
Company, the issue arises due to the International Court's opinion
in the Nottebohm Case. Indeed, three of the concurring judges
noted the issue in their opinions. Judges Fitzmaurice, Tanaka,
and Gros expressed regret that the question of Barcelona Traction's
nationality and the effect of the Nottebohm Case had not been
argued by the parties.
The statute of the International Court of Justice provides that
only states can be parties to actions brought before the Court.2
Consequently, if an individual is to be represented before the Court,
his claim must be espoused by his state. Nationality is determined
by one of several factors including his place of birth, his country
of naturalization, and other ties between an individual and a nation
which would constitute a sufficient nexus to be determinative.
It has been the customary practice in international law to entitle
a state to grant diplomatic protection to any company of its
nationality. However, there have been diverging views as to
the means of determining the nationality of corporations. The
principle tests have been the "seat of control"28 and "the place
of incorporation." 29  Other tests include. "domicile," "control,"
"beneficial interest," and "the place of responsibility for corporate
action. °30 The "seat of control" test adopted by the civil law
countries8 1 declares that the place where decisions are made
concerning the operation of the company establishes the nationality
of the corporation. Common law nations32 follow the "place of
incorporation" test. In the Barcelona Traction Case, the appli-
cation of both principle tests would result in the Canadian nation-
ality of the company. The Barcelona Traction Company was
incorporated and managed in Canada. Since Canada, as a common
law nation, follows the "incorporation" test, and Belgium, a civil
law state, has adopted the "seat of control" rule, it is not surprising
that the Belgian government and the Court agreed that the
Corporation was a Canadian national.
33
But the Canadian nationality of Barcelona Traction may not
have been as clear as the majority opinion would have us believe.
27. 59 Stat. 1055, 1059 Art. 34-1 (1945).
28. This test has been adopted by civil law countries.
29. This test has been adopted by common law countries.
30. SCHWARZENBERGER, INwwATIONAL LAW 288 (2d ed. 1949).
31. Harris, The Protection of Companies in International Law in the
Light of the Nottebohm Case, 18 INT'L & ComIp. LAW Q. 275, 296 (1969).
32. Id.
33. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 43.
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In his separate opinion, Judge Fitzmaurice asked what would have
happened if Canada had continued its efforts to act on behalf of
Barcelona Traction.34 Could it not have been reasonably expected
that Spain would have challenged Canada's standing on the
ground of an insufficient link between the Canadian government
and the Barcelona Traction Company to permit the action by
Canada? After all, Barcelona Traction was incorporated and man-
aged in Canada only as a matter of convenience. No other ties
between the two existed. The issue takes on added significance
when one notes the constant references in the majority opinion to
Canada's right to protect the corporation, since it seemed to be
an important justification for the Court's holding.
In this regard, the International Court's decision in the Nottebohm
Case, concerning the nationality of individuals, merits discussion.
Nottebohm was born a German national, but resided in Guatemala
where he conducted a business operation. Just prior to Germany's
invasion of Poland, he became a naturalized citizen of Liechtenstein
while visiting a relative in that country. Nottebohm then returned
to Guatemala where he was removed to the United States for
internment as a dangerous enemy alien, at which time Guatemalan
legislation transferred most of Nottebahm's property in the country
to the government. After his release, Nottebohm went to Liech-
tenstein which commenced proceedings against Guatemala in 1951
seeking damages for the expulsion of Nottebohm and the confis-
cation of his property. The Guatemalan government answered by
claiming that the Liechtenstein action was inadmissible because
there existed no "durable link" between Nottebohm and Liechten-
stein. In dismissing the complaint, the International Court de-
clared 35 that the legal bond of nationality must be based upon
a "genuine connection" between the individual and the State
assuming the claim in his behalf.
Although the Nottebohm Case dealt with the nationality of indi-
viduals, it is appropriate to explore the effects of the decision upon
the nationality of corporations.36 Companies have been considered
as separate entities apart from their owners in both municipal and
international law.37 They have a distinct juridical personality
34. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 80.
35. See Nottebohm Case, supra note 26, at 23.
36. See SCHwARZENBERGER, supra note 30.
37. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 33.
similar to that of individuals. Consequently, the rules for deter-
mining the nationality of individuals may provide the basis for
establishing the nationality of companies.
38
Assuming the Belgian government abandoned its traditional
"seat of control" test for determining whether it would afford
protection to companies, would the "genuine connection" test
permit Belgium to maintain the action against Spain? Initially,
there is some confusion concerning the "genuine connection" rule
itself.30 The Court in the Nottebohm Case noted at the outset in
its opinion that it would limit its decision to the question of whether
Liechtenstein could claim Nottebohm as a national vis-a-vis Guate-
mala.40 Much of the discussion in the case is concerned with com-
paring Nottebohm's relationships with the two litigating nations.
But after that discussion, the Court phrased the issue by focusing
on Nottebohm's ties to Liechtenstein compared to any other state.41
If the Court meant to restrict itself to the scope of its initial
analysis of the question, it would seem that "Guatemala" should
have been used in its final statement of the issue rather than "any
other state."42  Additional evidence that the use of "any other
state" may have been a mere oversight appears in the Court's
wording of its holding that Liechtenstein was not entitled to extend
protection to Nottebohm vis-a-vis Guatemala. In applying43 this
interpretation of the rationale in Nottebohm to the Barcelona
Traction Case, the Canadian ties to the Company become im-
material. The only question would be whether the corporation
had a more "genuine connection" with Belgium than with Spain.
Having posed the issue resulting from the application of the
above interpretation of the Nottebohm rule to the Barcelona
Traction Case, the next .step would be the creation of criteria for
determining whidh nation had closer ties with Barcelona Traction.
In this regard, the Court's discussion of specific factors44 for
determining the meaning of "genuine connection" in Nottebohm
is not particularly helpful, since it was concerned with individuals.
However, it seems that the establishment of appropriate guide-
lines for the "genuine connection" requirement with respect to
companies would be consistent with the fundamental proposition
38. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 30.
39. See SCHWARZENBEMG-R, supra note 30, at 289.
40. See Nottebohm Case, supra note 26, at 21.
41. See Nottebohm Case, supra note 26, at 24.
42. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 30, at 290.
43. Assuming the Nottebohm principle may have some application to
corporations. See note 31 supra.
44. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 30, at 292.
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described in the Nottebohm Case.45  Nationality of corporations
would hinge on economic connections 46 between the company and
the countries involved in the proceeding. The primary considera-
tions should reflect the contribution of the company to the
economies of the litigating parties, the residence of the corporation,
and the identity of its personal law.4 7 In the Barcelona Traction
Case, the application of the latter two factors would establish the
Canadian character of the company. Barcelona Traction maintained
its head office in Canada, and the Company was subject to the
Law of Canada regarding Corporations. But, as noted earlier,
the juristic relationship of Barcelona Traction to Canada is irrele-
vant. The only matter of concern is the Belgian government's
rights vis-A-vis Spain. So the economic connection factor would be
the single applicable test for determining whether Barcelona
Traction was more closely attached to Belgium or Spain.
Spanish economic interests in the Company consisted of the
location of the actual business activity (note that the place where
a company conducts its business operations is not its place of
residence) and the existence of Spanish creditors (the Spanish
government, Spanish bondholders, and Spanish citizens to whom
Barcelona Traction owed contractual obligations). On the other
hand, Belgian nationals owned the majority of the stock in the
Company.
48
It would thus seem reasonable to conclude that the consumption
by the Spanish people of Barcelona Traction's services and its in-
debtedness to a number of Spanish citizens would not be sufficient
to show a "genuine connection" greater than the ownership interest
vested in the Belgian nationals who were its shareholders. Con-
sumers and creditors have a very limited relationship with the
companies with which they deal. Consumers merely have a right
to expect a certain level of merchantibility in the products or
quality in its services; and creditors, a legal right to expect pay-
ment in due course. Shareholders on the other hand, are the
actual owners of the corporation, and theoretically rank at the
pinnacle of the corporate control hierarchy. Hence, Barcelona
45. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 30, at 292.
46. See SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 30, at 294.
47. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 30, at 293.
48. Belgium Nationals owned 88% of the stock in Barcelona Traction.
Traction would apparently have a more "genuine connection"
with Belgium than with Spain.
It should be noted that if a Nottebohm-type rule were applied
to nations seeking to protect corporations, companies would often
have the right to acquire diplomatic protection from more than
one country. Under the "genuine connection" test, Canada might
also have brought the claim of Barcelona Traction against Spain.
The multiple protection afforded by a general recognition of the
"genuine connection" rule would certainly expand the avenues
for relief to injured corporations and their shareholders.
The other interpretation of the Nottebohm rule is that the indi-
vidual must have a stronger connection with the claimant state
than with any other state. In the context of the Barcelona
Traction Case the issue would be whether Belgium would have
to show it had stronger ties with the Company than had Canada
in order to require Spain to recognize the claim.
Application of the criteria mentioned earlier for determining the
nationality of corporations would show a strong connection between
Canada and the Company based on the residence and personal law
considerations. Barcelona Traction was incorporated, established
its head office, and was subject to the corporate law in Canada.
On the other hand, Belgium's economic connection with the
Company was much stronger than Canada's. So, under this view
of the Nottebohm rule, the relative importance of the different
criteria for determining corporate nationality is in question.
Obviously, if the residence and personal law tests took precedence,
the "genuine connection" theory could be applied with greater ease
by a court. It would also have the effect of increasing certainty
in the law and reliance interests. But merely because a test may
be administered without much difficulty does not automatically
make it more just. The test selected should be the one which is
most likely to reflect the policy followed by a state in its decision
to protect a company. In other words, how would a state deter-
mine whether a sufficient "genuine connection" existed between it
and a corporation before deciding to extend diplomatic protection.
The primary consideration in a state's decision to protect a
company is the economic ties between the two. A state notes
whether it, or its citizens, have been financially prejudiced by
the wrongdoing of another nation. Indeed, the economic connection
factor takes on added significance when one examines the actual
practices of nations currently affording diplomatic protection to
companies under the existing tests for determining corporate
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nationality. Both the United States and the United Kingdom
appear to require more of an economic connection than mere
incorporation before granting diplomatic protection to companies.
49
In the United States, the nationality of the shareholders is a
major factor in determining whether there is a substantial American
interest5" which warrants intervention. Apparently Canada made
a similar assessment in the Barcelona Traction situation just before
it lost interest in pursuing a remedy against Spain.51 While injured
shareholders, individual and corporate, should not be rendered
helpless because of the lack of interest or standing of nation-states
entitled to maintain a suit in their behalf, nevertheless, that is
the present state of the law of nations governing the international
arena the multinationals call "home."
The other possible basis for the Belgian claim and the approach
adopted by the Belgian government would permit the national
state of the shareholders to maintain an action in their behalf.
Judges Fitzmaurice, Tanaka, Jessup and Gros noted that inter-
national law should recognize a right in the shareholders for an
injustice resulting in injury to their company.
In the Barcelona Traction Case, the Belgian government actually
based its claim on the injury to the shareholders of the Company.
As investors in the Barcelona Traction Company, the shareholders'
financial interests were prejudiced by the action of the Spanish
government. Thus, Belgium alleged it had the right to afford
diplomatic protection to the shareholders who were Belgian na-
tionals.
The International Court rejected the Belgian claim of injury to
the shareholders. In doing so, the Court noted the separate legal
personality of a corporation and the limited remedies available
to shareholders for injuries to a company. Shareholders were
held not to have the capacity to maintain an action in their own
right for indirect injuries to their interests in a corporation.
52
Undoubtedly, the Court in the Barcelona Traction Case was
correct in stating the separate legal personality of corporations.
49. See SCHWARZENBERGEI, supra note 30, at 310.
50. HACKWORTH, 5 DIG. INT'L LAW 839.
51. Barcelona Traction Light & Power Co., Ltd., [1964] I.C.J. Reports 3, 62
[hereinafter cited as Barcelona].
52. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 36.
It is also true that generally only the corporation may seek redress
for wrongs done the company, shareholders being only indirectly
affected by injuries to their corporation. However, shareholders
suffer financial losses when their company is deemed bankrupt
in the same way as when they are unjustly denied dividends
(considered a direct loss). There are instances in municipal law
where courts have pierced the corporate veil to permit shareholders
to take action in their own names for injuries inflicted upon their
company.53 Generally these actions are allowed when the officers
of the corporation either are responsible for the loss or fail to
take proper steps to protect the company. So situations do exist
in municipal legal systems in which investors may seek relief
for damage to their indirect interests in a corporation.
But in the context of international law, an added problem arises.
The shareholders of the Barcelona Traction Company were not
forced to take action because the directors or officers of the
corporation failed to act. Rather, they were initially frustrated
by the lack of Canadian interest. It is firmly established in inter-
national law that a state has complete discretion in deciding
whether it will grant diplomatic protection to one of its nationals.
Therefore, Belgium could not claim that Canada failed to act as
international law required. But it would appear that good reason
exists for allowing Belgium to protect the shareholders. The
Canadian government could hardly be expected to react sympa-
thetically to the pleas of Belgian nationals. The Canadian govern-
ment had no political responsibility to the foreign investors. Like-
wise, the mere Canadian nationality of Barcelona Traction Company
was not a suficient link with Canadian interests to expect the
government to act. In other words, the Canadian government was
under limited pressure to grant the political right of diplomatic
protection to Barcelona Traction. The International Court failed
to mention the weak position of the Belgian shareholders vis-a-vis
the Canadian government when it emphasized the right of the
shareholders to seek protection for the company from Canada.
Shareholders should not be compelled to seek aid from a foreign
state which is unlikely to be sympathetic to their plight. The
Belgian shareholders were in a position similar to that of the
investors, under municipal law, who are permitted to act because
the officers of their corporation declined to do so. In both situations,
the shareholders would be denied appropriate relief if their claim
were disallowed. In fact, there may be stronger reasons for
allowing the foreign shareholders to seek the diplomatic protection
53. Jones, Claims on Behalf of Nationals Who Are Shareholders in For-
eign Companies, 26 BraiT. Y.B. INT'L 236 (1949).
[voL. 11: 70, 1973] Centralization of Multinationals
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEV
of their own government, since they have far less power to influ-
ence the state of the corporation than have the municipal investors
to replace the officers of their company.
A few of the concurring judges expressed the view that the
development of international law in this area need not be bound
by municipal and private law concepts. Judge Tanaka remarked
that international law must be flexible and take the realities of the
situation into account in determining the rules of law among
nations.5 4 He cited the following quote from Judge Wellington
Koo from the 1964 judgment concerning the preliminary objections:
International law, being primarily based upon the general prin-
ciples of law and justice, is unfettered by technicalities and for-
malistic considerations which are often given importance in mu-
nicipal law ... It is the reality which counts more than the
appearance. It is the equitable interest which matters rather than
the legal interest. In other words it is the substance which carried
weight on the international plane rather than the form.55
Accordingly, he dismissed the majority opinion's distinction between
shareholder rights and interests as being too formalistic. An
injury to an equitable interest is enough to warrant protection in
international law.
5 6
In a similar fashion, Judge Gros expressed his displeasure over
the suggestion that municipal rules of law should govern the
development of international law.57 Municipal law is nothing more
than a fact in evidence to be considered with the other facts, and
no more.5 8 With that premise, he had no difficulty in deciding
that when a company is destroyed the shareholders necessarily
suffer a loss in the form of the destruction of their investment.5 9
Such an injury is entitled to redress.
Hence, the shareholders in Barcelona Traction may be con-
sidered to have suffered an injury cognizable in international
law, notwithstanding the rules of municipal corporate law. Belgium
would then have standing to grant diplomatic protection of its
nationals in an action against Spain for damage resulting to the
shareholders.
54. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 127.
55. See Barcelona, supra note 51, at 62-3.
56. Case of the Cayuga Indians (Great Britain v. U.S.), 6 U.N. Rep. 173
(1926).
57. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 272.
58. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 272.
59. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 276.
Another means of justifying the right of Belgium to protect its
nationals would be through analogy to the existing situation where
the national state of shareholders may sue in their behalf. In its
opinion in the Barcelona Traction Case, the International Court
cited the "general rule" that state may only grant diplomatic
protection to companies incorporated and maintaining a registered
office in its territory.60 This principle seems to be based on the
notion that corporations in international law are distinct juridical
persons which may be protected by their national states. However,
the International Court also noted three so-called "exceptions"
to the "general rule." The first exception arises when the state
entitled to grant diplomatic protection to the corporation is the
one which has inflicted the damage to the company. Obviously,
a corporation can hardly receive adequate protection from the
same nation from which it seeks a recovery. ft has been the
practice of a number of nations to intervene in this situation to
protect their nationals who are shareholders in a foreign company.6'
Were there no such exception, a nation could seize a company,
compensate its citizens for their loss, and totally disregard the for-
eign interests involved, since these alien interests would be unable
to take action against this state in the international sphere.
In the Ziat Ben Kiran Case,62 a Spanish corporation suffered
injury due to a riot in the Spanish zone of Morocco in 1921. The
United Kingdom brought a claim against Spain for negligence on
behalf of one of its nationals who was a majority shareholder in
the company. Spain contested Britain's standing to bring such
a claim, since the corporation was not a British national. This
objection was rejected by the claims commission because it would
have been inequitable to preclude Britain from maintaining the
action, since its national had suffered a loss and the national state
of the corporation was the defendant in the proceeding.63
A similar result was reached in the El Triunfo Case.64 In 1894,
the government of Salvador granted a concession to two United
States nationals to set up a steamboat service on the condition
that they form the corporation under Salvadorean law. The
company was created and all the shares were owned by citizens
of the United States. Due to certain irregularities in the corpora-
tion, its lawful directors were replaced with others who bank-
60. See Barcelona, supra note 22.
61. See Jones, supra note 53, at 328.
62. Ziat Ben Kiran Case, [1923-24] Ann. Dig. 129 (No. 102).
63. Id. at 130.
64. C.J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 649 (1906).
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rupted the company in furtherance of their personal interests.
The Salvadorean government then awarded the concession to
another company. The United States attempted to intervene on
behalf of an American shareholder in the corporation. Salvador
objected, contending that, since the corporation was a Salvadorean
national, the United States had no standing to maintain the claim.
The decision of the arbitrator was that, under the circumstances,
equity justified United States espousal of the claim.
65
The exception illustrated by these cases cannot be directly
applied to the Barcelona Traction situation. Since it was a Canadian
corporation allegedly injured by Spain, Canada always had the
option to bring an action on the company's behalf.
Another exception to the "general rule" would allow the nation
of which the shareholders were nationals to protect them when
a company is virtually defunct or in liquidation. It is a fact that
a corporation may be dismantled to a point where it cannot
effectively initiate legal action, and in such case a receiver or
liquidator may not be able to represent the company adequately
in some situations.66 Shareholder interests also become direct
when a corporation is in liquidation, since they have a right to
the remaining assets after the company's debts are paid. This
exception is, in part illustrated by the Delagoa Railway Case.
6 7
British and United States citizens formed a company under Portu-
guese law for the purpose of constructing a railway. During the
course of construction, a dispute arose between the Portuguese
authorities and the directors of the corporation over the exact
point of termination of the railway, whereupon the government
of Portugal cancelled the concession and seized the railroad. Both
Britain and the United States protested on the basis of the interests
of their nationals. The United States made the argument that the
company was without remedy and had practically ceased to
exist, hence, the only recourse for the injured shareholders was
through their respective governments. A tribunal of Swiss jurists
permitted the claim,66 although it must be noted that the issue
of standing was, in effect, conceded by Portugal in that the question
65. See Jones, supra note 53, at 236.
66. See MOORE, supra note 64, at 647.
67. See MOORE, supra note 64, at 649.
68. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 41.
put to the tribunal presumed the jus standi of both Britain and the
United States to press the claims of their respective nationals to
the extent of their interests in the Portuguese company.
In the instant case, Barcelona Traction was in receivership in
Canada. The Court felt that such a status, far from impairing
the rights of the company, actually preserved the corporate entity
and its rights.69 It is ironic, as suggested by Judge Fitzmaurice,70
that the shareholders would have been in a better legal position
had their company been rendered defunct by the action of Spain or
had it been a Spanish national, since in either of those two situations
it would initially seem that the company was at a greater disad-
vantage.
A third exception to the "general rule" concerns the situation
where a treaty between the nation of the shareholders and the
defendant state recognizes the right of each to sue on behalf of
its shareholder nationals regardless of the nationality of the corpo-
ration. No such treaty existed between Belgium and Spain.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Court's treatment of
these three situations in the Barcelona Traction Case was labelling
them as "exceptions" to the "general rule." The "general rule"
regarding the protection of companies developed as a matter of
convenience. Since shareholders in a corporation may consist of
nationals of a number of different states, there existed a possibility
for confusion in determining what nation might properly extend
diplomatic protection to a company. So international law recognized
the corporation itself as a distinct entity capable of enjoying na-
tionality. To determine the nationality of companies, international
law merely adopted the tests developed by the various municipal
law systems.
Initially, it seems that the "general rule" is actually a means of
accomplishing an objective. The goal is to assure that corporations
will be properly protected in international law, and the rule
deeming the corporation to have the nationality of its state of
incorporation is merely a means of reaching the desirable result.
Indeed, in most cases companies can be protected by their national
states. But, as evidenced by the situations described earlier, other
rules or means have been recognized for reaching the goal of
adequate protection of companies in international law. Merely
because cases involving the latter three fact situations may be
infrequent is not sufficient reason for classifying them as "ex-
69. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 75.
70. See Jones, supra note 53, at 236.
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ceptions" to another more generally applicable mechanism for
protecting companies. All four rules have been developed for the
same purpose.
With this background, it would seem that another rule based on
the Barcelona Traction situation should be recognized. The prin-
ciples which allow the state of the shareholders to intervene when
the corporation is defunct or when the offending nation is also a
state of which the company is deemed a national are grounded upon
the notion that corporations are entitled to means of receiving
meaningful protection. Although the latter rule may have the
further justification that a state can hardly maintain an action
against itself, there is no reason why a nation may not protect
a company which is a national in the former situation. In other
words, when the injured corporation is defunct, it has two options
in seeking diplomatic protection. The company may solicit the
aid of its national state. But if this type of representation will be
of no practical effect,71 international law has, and should, recognize
the right of the country of which the shareholders are nationals to
intervene on behalf of the shareholders. The justification for this
rule is based on assuring meaningful avenues of relief for injured
companies and their shareholders. Similarly, when the national
state of a corporation expresses little interest in protecting the
company, the existence of the right of the national state to intervene
is of no practical effect. The nation of the shareholders ought
to have had the same right of intervention in the Barcelona Trac-
tion Case as is recognized in the case of the defunct corporation. fn
both instances, a rule conceding the right of the national state of
the shareholders to protect the shareholders is necessary to assure
the meaningful protection of the corporation and the shareholders.
Even if the three rules mentioned by the International Court
in the Barcelona Traction Case were accepted as exceptions to the
general rule that only the national state of the corporation may
protect it and the shareholders for injuries inflicted upon the
company, the situation involving the Barcelona Traction Company
should be deemed as another such execption. It should be recalled
that the reason for the first two exceptions centered on the ad-
mission that corporations and their shareholders are entitled to
71. See Barcelona, supra note 51, at 60.
meaningful protection. In the same way, an exception should be
developed to cover the case where the national state of the corpora-
tion fails to act. The company in the Barcelona Traction Case
was denied protection when Canada refused to continue its right
to pursue the claim. The majority opinion dealt in significant
length with the clarification of the Company's right to be repre-
sented by Canada, but conveniently neglected to emphasize the
lack of Canadian interest. If the decision-makers in the past cases
regarding the recognized exceptions to the general rule had also
failed to inquire into the realities of the situations before them,
the development of those exceptions might never have occurred.
Fortunately, the realities of the situation were examined, and the
International Court perpetuated an injustice by failing to examine
them in the Barcelona Traction Case. An additional exception to
cover the Barcelona Traction situation is necessary to assure ade-
quate protection for the Company. The situation in Barcelona
Traction parallels the past exceptions to the general rule, and an
additional exception to the general rule ought to have been
developed to cover it.
Although it may be conceded that the state of corporate nation-
ality should have the initial right of action just as corporations have
the right to maintain an action in the first instance in municipal
law, there is no legal justification for restricting the avenues of
international relief to actions taken by the state of corporate
nationality, nor has this been the international practice in the
past when the rule has failed to assure the adequate protection of
shareholders.
A co-existing rule72 permitting the state of the shareholders to
maintain an action when the state of which the corporation is a
national fails to act would be consistent with the rule which allows
shareholders to act on behalf of the company when the corporation
is defunct. Both serve to assure that corporations and shareholders
receive effective protection" of their interests.
The Idea of Multiple Protection
The two mechanisms discussed above have a singular purpose.
Adequate protection of corporations and shareholders is the com-
mon goal. The notion of multiple protection plays a major role
in assuring that investors will be able to get relief for injuries
inflicted upon their company. The idea of multiple protection
is not really a new development in international law. In the
72. See Barcelona, supra note 51, at 58.
73. Reparations for Injuries Case, [1949] I.C.J. 174.
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Reparations for Injuries Case74 the International Court recognized
that a person may have more than one basis of protection. This
case was distinguished by the Court in the Barcelona Traction Case
without much discussion of the similarities and dissimilarities of
the two situations. Of course, there is a factual difference between
the two cases. The Reparations for Injuries Case dealt with an
individual's right to be protected by his national state and by the
international organization to which he belongs. The International
Court in Barcelona Traction apparently distinguished the case by
noting the individual's direct loss in the Reparations for Injuries
situation, while classifying the shareholders' interests in Barcelona
Traction as indirect. But, as discussed earlier, shareholders have
been given the right to take action for indirect losses when they
would otherwise be denied a remedy. So shareholders may have
two bases 5 of protection as did the individual in the Reparations
for Injuries Case. Indeed, Judge Jessup noted the distinct possi-
bility for multiple protection in the instant case based on an
analogy with the Reparations for Injuries Case.
76
There are difficulties, however, in attempting to use the Repara-
tions for Injuries Case as precedent for allowing the Belgian claim
in the Barcelona Traction Case. The factual difference and the
direct-indirect injury problems cited above are two such pitfalls.
In addition, it is always dangerous to expand the holdings of prior
cases to encompass situations probably not contemplated by the
Court in the previous decision. But, at the very least, the Repara-
tions for Injuries Case does support the fundamental idea of
multiple protection, and only the extent of the doctrine is really
now in question.7 7 There is also evidence in the recent literature
that the notion of multiple protection is being accepted as a
principle of international law.
78
Given the developing principle of multiple protection, the question
of how best to implement it into the Barcelona Traction situation
remains. The first rule discussed, which would allow the nation
of the shareholders to claim the corporation as its national vis-a-vis
74. Id.; and see Barcelona, supra note 22, at 38.
75. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 199.
76. Flemming, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light & Power
Co. Ltd., 3 CAN. Y.B. INTL L. 306, 313 (1965).
77. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 43.
78. See Barcelona, supra note 22, at 34.
an offending state or any other state because of a more genuine
connection with the company, has unnecessary pitfalls. It would
create a situation where the mere transfer of stock across national
boundaries would result in a change of the nationality of the
corporation. In view of the rapid way in which shares may change
hands in today's world, such a rule could create havoc in deter-
mining the nationality of many companies.
The rule which would enable the nation of the investors to
maintain the claim on behalf of the shareholders themselves does
not entail the difficulties presented by the other method of ex-
panding the avenues of relief to shareholders. The nationality of
the company need not change with the transfer of shares. In
developing the rule, the International Court would be serving the
ends of justice in international law and exercising due caution.
However the International Court might choose to develop the
rule, the expansion of the multiple protection idea to the Barcelona
Traction situation will aid shareholders seeking a remedy. But
problems of a procedural nature are bound to emerge. The most
serious ones would include: (1) situations where both the corpo-
ration and its shareholders are separately seeking the aid of their
respective national states to maintain an action; (2) problems
created by the easy transferability of shares; (3) amount of share-
holder interest which would justify intervention by the state of
the investors; (4) inconsistency in judgments. The first difficulty
could be resolved by recognizing a primary right in the state
of corporate nationality to protect a company. Shareholders would
be permitted to seek the aid of their own government only after the
state of a corporation has declined to take action. The problem
created by the easy transferability of shares might be solved by a
requirement similar to that found in derivative suits under munici-
pal law. Before shareholders may act in municipal law, ownership
of their shares must be shown to have been concurrent with the
injury to the company. The third and fourth procedural difficulties
might also be eliminated through supervision by the International
Court to assure either that the state initiating the action would
properly represent all the shareholders and reserve to their respec-
tive states a pro rata share of any recovery, or preferably, the
development of a joinder-type rule whereby a number of states
having nationals as shareholders in the injured company join in the
proceeding. The application of the concept of res judicata would
prevent a multiplicity of suits.
To be sure, these procedural guidelines could turn out to be
quite intricate. But the institution of a judicial system for the
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resolution of disputes should be primarily concerned with the
administration of justice and not with administrative convenience.
Barcelona Traction and the Management of Multinational Enter-
prise
In writing its opinion, the International Court of Justice was
not unmindful of the existence of multinational corporations and
the impact of its decision upon them. In noting the "profound trans-
formations which have taken place in the economic life of na-
tions . . ." the Court specifically recognized "the corporate entity"
as "one of these phenomena ... which have transcended frontiers
and have begun to exercise considerable influence on international
relations. '79 In fact, the court even expressed a measure of surprise
in observing:
Considering the important developments of the last half cen-
tury, the growth of foreign investments in the expansion of inter-
national activities of corporations, in particular of holding com-
panies, which are often multinational, and considering the way in
which at first sight appear surprising that the evolution of law has
not gone further and that no general accepted rules in the matter
have crystallized on the international plane.8 0
It is rather unfortunate that the opinion of the court did not
significantly add much substance to the process of "crystallization."
The lessons, such as they are, for multinational corporations
and their counsel to be distilled from Barcelona Traction may
perhaps be summarized as follows:
1. Multiple bases of protection probably will not be available
and the MNC must choose the situs from which to make its foreign
investments on the basis of its ability to obtain diplomatic protec-
tion for such investments as well as on other economic, political,
managerial and tax considerations.
2. Effective protection for such investments in the absence of
the availability of diplomatic protection can only be afforded second
tier investments by:
a. agreement with the host country to submit any dispute aris-




81. Pursuant to the Convention of Investment Disputes between States
b. by the conclusion of a multilateral treaty providing for
the espousal of diplomatic claims for the protection for
shareholder interests.
3. By centralizing its international operations and consolidating
the beneficial interests of its subsidiary companies in the "parent"
corporation, the MNC assures itself of a firm legal basis for ob-
taining the benefits of the diplomatic protection of the country of
its charter.
8 2
A GLANCE AT THE FUTUPE
It would be interesting to speculate the role, if any, that would
today be played by multinationals had the International Trade
Organization, as originally perceived by the Havana Conference,
not been scuttled and replaced by relative innocuousness. The ITO
was designed, of course, to create an international free trade area
amongst its membership without the necessity of leaping the bar-
riers of free trade. With its creation the methodology and, quite
probably, the purpose of the multinationals would have developed
differently and purely international corporations, those with a
home base of operations with merely foreign markets rather than
subsidiaries, might well have developed in their stead.
While backwards speculation as to what might have been may
be interesting, it is not necessarily productive with respect to our
present problem, "Centralizing the International Operations of
Multinationals." On the other hand, speculation as to the next
few decades may be useful in making future projections and pre-
dictions as to the operations and management characteristics of
multinationals.
and Nationals of other States March 18, 1965 formulated by the Executive
Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
following on the convening of four regional meetings in Adis Ababa, San-
tiago de Chile, Geneva and Bangkok, ICSID, HISTORy oF THE CONVENTION
(in four volumes), (1970).
82. In addition, it could expect to receive the benefits of legislation
presently existing which serves as a deterrent to foreign takings of, for
example, investments of U.S. companies. See the "Hickenlooper Amend-
ment" to the Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (e) (1962), which pro-
vides that, "The President shall suspend assistance to the government of
any country which has . . ." expropriated or seized ownership or control
of property owned by any U.S. citizen or corporation; see also "Sabbatino
Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Ac of 1964, 73 Stat. 1013, as
amended 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1964) which provides that, "no court in
the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state
doctrine to make a determination on the giving effect to the principles of
international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to
property is asserted by any party including a foreign state a confiscation or
other taking after Jan. 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the
principles of international law ... "
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One of the most interesting examples of crystal ball gazing was,
as noted earlier, undertaken by the Diebold Institute 3 wherein
it was suggested that industrial growth would move from the
highly industrialized and developed areas of North America, North-
west Europe and Japan to Southern Europe, North Africa, South
America, and quite conceivably, to the Communist East European
and Asian spheres. Their prediction appears, at first glance, to be
a happy prophesy-industrial production being shifted from the
economically impoverished four-fifths of the world whose people
hunger for jobs and the benefits of industrial plenty. The article
anticipates a "manufacturing revolution" as industry "rolls South
from the rich North to the poor South of the world."8 4 At the same
time, the authors predict political crises resulting from the aggra-
vated tensions and stimulated nationalism that will develop as a
result of the extra-territorial and basically exploitative nature of
the process of industrialization. While applauding the redistribu-
tion of wealth and betterment of the less developed sectors of the
world, Vfr. Diebold and the Diebold Institute recognize the neces-
sity of requiring the MNC's to develop a code of conduct by which
equitable and beneficial relations with the host countries should
be established. At the same time, the multinational is not going
to escape being the target of a dissonance in the industrialized
North where, for example, labor has teamed with protectionists to
support in the United States the Burke-Hartke bill,8 which would
have the effect of retrenching the process of multinationalism and
withdrawing the corporate enterprise to fortress America in order
that the jobs now being created for "foreigners" will be created
for "Americans."
The Diebold proposals also fail to note the enormous crisis in
the international monetary system and the role the multinational
enterprise has played in developing and exacerbating this crisis.86
83. See Diebold Institute supra note 20. See also Diebold, Precarious
Path of the Multinationals, Wall St. J., August 17, 1973, at 19; and Diebold,
Business, Government and Science: The Need for a Fresh Look, 51 FOREIGN
Ar. 555 (1973).
84. Wall St. J., supra note 83, at 19.
85. H.R. 10914, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
86. See, e.g. Bowen, Multi-national Corporations, U.S. NAVAL INsT E
PRocEDn NGs 55 (1973); Fisher, The Multinationals and the Crisis in the U.S.
Trade and Investment Policy, 53 BosT. U.L. REV. 308 (1973); Baum, The
Global Corporation: An American Challenge to the Nation State Query, 55
IOWA L, REv, 410 (1970),
Nevertheless, it gives us a framework for conceiving of a world
twenty years hence where multinational treaties will have pro-
vided a measure of consistency to the status and treatment of multi-
nationals (although note that the word "control" has been pur-
posefully omitted); where industrialization has spread to the de-
veloping areas of the world; but where the origin, source, develop-
ment and control over technology remains in the North. In other
words, the underdeveloped countries may get their jobs and the
benefits of development, but the inevitable pollution and the
ecological problems which naturally follow the process of industri-
alization will come to plague them as well. On the other hand,
while the North can expect to benefit from the clean air and
waters that may follow as factories are packed up and moved to
the waiting labor in the South, the major impact of the shift of
production will be to strengthen its international position because
computerization and the requisite control over marketing, dis-
tribution and wealth will continue to lead to more and more control
by the North being exercised over global business.
Such projections call for expansion of training facilities and the
development of both broader and deeper educational and technologi-
cal bases for what will essentially become a "white collar" North,
even as "blue collar" jobs are shifted in a southerly direction. The
very nature of these developments will lead to increased concen-
tration of the intellectual, technical and managerial talent in what
is and will apparently remain the center of multinational enter-
prise.
CONCLUSION
We began by noting that the process of centralization of the
international operations of multinationals began in the 1960's.
From what has been said, there is every reason to believe that
centralization is the proper trend for managing the operations in
the 1970's and, by all that can presently be anticipated, this trend
will remain the key toward success in the 1980's and beyond.
While tangential reference occasionally has seemed appropriate,
the purpose of this writing was not to explore the many satellite
problems to the primary thesis; problems which need not only ex-
ploration, but resolution, if multinational enterprise is to continue
to exist in the decades ahead. The problems of host countries,
the reasonable aspirations of their peoples, the international mone-
tary system and the other multifarious requirements of inter-
national trade and investment that affect the operations not only
of the multinational corporations, but also the nation-states who
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continue to have primary responsiblity for the global welfare of
mankind, will all have to be served.
The point of our paper and its modest goal was to suggest that
by centralizing its international operations, the MNC would obtain
many benefits not the least of which would be increased control of
its global operations because of its greater flexibility and improved
ability to react rapidly to changed circumstances as well as to
new opportunities. In addition, centralizing control along bene-
ficial ownership of its global investments would bring the MNC
within the existing legal framework of diplomatic protection.
Furthermore, it is not too optimistic to expect some unexpected
fringe benefits to develop in the form of less hostility from
Congress, the Treasury Department and labor unions, once the
use of second and third tier offshore investments are liquidated
into the U.S. parent. Finally, the requirements of the future-
when technological innovation and research and development be-
come the major industry of the parent corporation, and management
planning, marketing and distribution become its major contribution
to its industrial empire-appear forcefully to dictate the concen-
tration of control at the source of the power structure. In short,
just as "all paths lead to Rome," all the international operations
of multinational enterprise should lead inevitably to a central
hierarchy, a centralized superstructure and base from which all
are controlled.
If multinational enterprise is to continue to survive, and more
importantly, to thrive, it will have to find its place in the overall
hierarcy of things; to contribute more to world order than to its
own private coffers. Perhaps this is too much to ask. It is,
however, but a matter of enlightened self-interest, and multinational
enterprise, which has been so quick to conform and to adapt to the
exigencies of international business in an essentially hostile en-
vironment, is not apt, at this juncture, to fail itself,
